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iABSTRACT
Producing shale oil on a large scale is one of the possible
alternatives for reducing dependence of the United States on imported
petroleum. Industry is not producing shale oil on a commercial scale now
because costs are too high even though industry dissatisfaction is most
frequently expressed about "non-economic" barriers: innumerable permits,
changing environmental regulations, lease limitations, water rights
conflicts, legal challenges, and so on. The overall purpose of this
study is to estimate whether improved technology might significantly
reduce unit costs for production of shale oil in a planned large-scale
industry as contrasted to the case usually contemplated: a small
industry evolving slowly on a project-by-project basis.
In this preliminary phase of the study, we collected published data
on the costs of present shale oil technology and adjusted them to common
conditions; these data were assembled to help identify the best targets
for cost reduction through improved large-scale technology They show
that the total cost of producing upgraded shale oil (i.e. shale oil
accpetable as a feed to a petroleum refinery) by surface retorting ranges
from about $18 to $28/barrel in late '78 dollars with a 20% chance that
the costs would be lower than and 20% higher than that range. The
probability distribution reflects our assumptions about ranges of shale
richness, process performance, rate of return, and other factors that
seem likely in a total industry portfolio of projects.
About 40% of the total median cost is attributable to retorting, 20%
to upgrading, and the remaining 40% to resource acquisition, mining,
crushing, and spent shale disposal and revegetation. Capital charges
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account for about 70% of the median total cost and operating costs for
the other 30%.
There is a reasonable chance that modified in-situ processes (like
Occidental's) may be able to produce shale oil more cheaply than surface
retorting, but no reliable cost data have been published; in 1978, DOE
estimated a saving of roughly $5/B for in-situ.
Because the total costs of shale oil are spread over many steps in
the production process, improvements in most or all of those steps are
required if we seek a significant reduction in total cost. A June 1979
workshop of industry experts was held to help us identify possible
cost-reduction technologies. Examples of the improved large-scale
technologies proposed (for further evaluation) to the workshop were:
- Instead of hydrotreating raw shale oil to make syncrude capable of
being refined conventionally, rebalance all of a refinery's
processes (or develop new catalysts/processes less sensitive to
feed nitrogen) to accommodate shale oil feed -- a change analogous
to a shift from sweet crude to sour crude.
- Instead of refining at or near the retort site, use heated
pipelines to move raw shale oil to existing major refining areas.
- Instead of operating individual mines, open-pit mine all or much
of the Piceance Creek Basin.
- Instead of building individual retorts, develop new methods for
mass production of hundreds of retorts.
iii
SHALE OIL
Table of Contents
Page
Abstract i
Acknowledgment v
1. Introduction 1
1.1 The Significance of Shale Oil 2
1.2 Background 3
1.3 Technology 4
1.4 The Evolutionary View and the In-Place View 7
1.5 Scope of the Study 8
1.6 The Study, the Industry, and Technological Change 10
2. The Cost of Producing Shale Oil 14
2.1 Solids Preparation and Disposal 16
2.2 Retorting 19
2.3 Upgrading 22
2.4 Total Costs 23
3. Conclusions 27
APPENDIX A: The Process of Technological Change Al
A.1 The Nature of the Process Al
A.2 A Summary View A9
A.3 An Interpretation A10
A.4 The Shakedown Period A14
A.5 "Experience" Cost Reduction A15
A.6 Applicability to This Study A17
APPENDIX B: Shale Oil Cost Estimates
B.1 Introduction
B.2 Mining for Surface Retorting
B.3 Surface Retorting
B.4 Upgrading
TABLES
Table B-1 Mining Costs
Table B-2 Surface Retorting Costs
Table B-3 Upgrading Costs
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4
FIGURES
Cost of Solids Preparation and Disposal
Cost of Retorting
Cost of Upgrading
Total Cost of Shale Syncrude
Figure A-1
Figure A-2
Figure A-3
Figure A-4
Figure A-5
The Experience Curve A7
Commercialization and the Process of Technological Change All
Cost Uncertainties and Break-Even Costs A13
The Shakedown A16
An Industry in Place A20
iv
B1
B1
B2
B5
B10
B4
Bll
B12
18
21
24
25
vACKNOWLEDGMENT
Funding for this preliminary work on a potential U.S. shale oil
industry was supplied by grants from the Edna McConnell Clark, Ford, and
Alfred P. Sloan Foundations, and we are grateful to them. We have also
profited from discussions with individuals in the U.S. Department of
Energy and in companies currently active in shale oil development.
1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to consider whether production of shale
oil on a large scale could present opportunities for significant cost
reduction through better technology. Large-scale production of shale oil
is one possible means for reducing the need to import petroleum. Our
definition of "large-scale" is 10-25% of current consumption of liquid
fuels in the U.S., or about 2 to 5 million barrels per day.
As this introduction is being written (April 1979), newspaper
headlines again feature the sharply rising prices and uncertain supplies
of imported petroleum. If there is any aspect of energy upon which most
informed people agree, it is that our heavy, and prospectively heavier,
reliance on foreign petroleum is not good for the United States. The
unfavorable nature of such dependence may be seen as arising from
national security or foreign policy considerations or as stemming from
strictly economic effects; in any case the overall conclusion is the
same, and the headlines seem to confirm that conclusion.
There is much less agreement about which particular alternatives are
less objectionable for the United States than importing so much oil. One
broad alternative is to consume less liquid fuel through conservation or
through substitution of other forms of domestic energy like coal, gas,
and renewable sources. Another broad alternative is to reduce imports of
liquid fuels by increasing supplies of domestic substitutes like coal
liquids, frontier oil, tertiary oil, and shale oil. A third broad
alternative, gaining favor recently, is encouraging more production in
and importing more oil from Western Hemisphere rather than presumably
less benign Eastern Hemisphere sources.
2The debate over the alternatives--the specific ones even more than
the broad ones--has been exhaustive and public. It is not our purpose to
review the advantages and disadvantages of each or to choose among them.
Unhappily, all the alternatives seem to have significant economic
penalties or significant environmental penalties or both associated with
them. In fact, government policy is likely to employ all the
alternatives simultaneously to various degrees. We are considering some
of the possibilities for shale oil in order to determine whether shale
oil could become a more desirable alternative than it now seems to be.
Our concentration on shale oil implies no judgment about the desirability
of shale oil compared to other alternatives.
1.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SHALE OIL
Interest in shale oil is motivated largely by the enormous size of
oil shale deposits in the United States. Known rich and accessible
resources contain about 600 billion barrels; a recovery of about
one-third of that resource would equal almost one hundred years of
imports of petroleum at the current rate.
A further reason for interest in oil shale processing is that
processes for the production of liquid fuels from oil shale appear
cheaper than those that start from coal.1 This is primarily because
oil shale contains a very much higher ratio of hydrogen to carbon, and
process costs tend to correlate directly with the increase in the net H/C
ratio required. This cost advantage is somewhat offset by increased
1e.g. Stanford Research Institute, "A Western Regional Energy
Development Study: Economics, Volume 1", SRI Project 4000, November
1976, p. 7; or U.S. Department of Energy, Policy and Evaluation
Division, cited in "Inside D.O.E.", May 18, 1979, p. 6.
3materials handling required by shale. But, on balance, it has been
recommended that most liquid synfuels be produced from shale. 1
1.2 BACKGROUND
Oil shale processing has been practiced on an industrial scale since
the 1860's. Much "coal oil" produced in the United States before the
discovery of petroleum was in fact shale oil. Production of 2,500 B/D
was maintained by the Scottish oil shale industry for long periods of
time over its 100-year history. A Manchurian oil shale industry, begun
in 1929, reached outputs of 35,000 B/D while under Japanese control
during World War II. The Chinese expanded the Manchurian operation, and
output during the Korean War is believed to have been as high as 40,000
B/D.2
During the 1960's, shale oil R&D was being carried on by several of
the major oil companies, and by The Oil Shale Company (TOSCO), newly
formed expressly to become a major factor in a new shale oil industry.
With the announcement of the sale of U.S. Government shale leases in Utah
and Colorado in early 1974, the level of R&D was increased somewhat.
This lease sale, taking place at the height of the 1973-74 Arab oil
embargo, elicited over 1/2 billion dollars in bids from several major oil
companies plus TOSCO. These companies appear to have been acting largely
on the belief that some combination of the following conditions would
1
"Recommendations for a Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program",
Synfuels Interagency Task Force Report to The President's Energy
Resources Council, November 1975, Vol II, p. 18, Fig. 8, p. H-27.
2Hammond, Ogden H. and Robert E. Baron, "Synthetic Fuels: Price,
Prospects, and Prior Art", American Scientist (July-August 1976), pp.
407-417.
4obtain: (1) world oil prices would continue to rise, and the cost of
shale oil production would then be at a level that would make the
industry viable at world oil prices, and/or (2) shale oil would be
"needed", and therefore prices would be paid that would make its
production profitable, regardless of the market prices and costs, and/or
(3) the government would take whatever steps might be necessary to ensure
that the necessary technology and regulatory environment would be
available, and that Federal subsidies in some form would be available if
needed for construction of the early plants,1 and/or (4) improvements
in technology would reduce the real costs of shale oil.
Since the lease sale, each of the lessees has been conducting
engineering and feasibility studies, studying environmental impact, etc.,
but only modest progress has been made in either the technology or the
conceptual development of the shale oil industry with the possible
exception of Occidental's modified in-situ process.
1.3 TECHNOLOGY
Oil shale processing technology is simple in principle. Oil shale
contains a carbonaceous material called "kerogen". When oil shale is
retorted, i.e. heated to about 8000F, the kerogen decomposes
(pyrolyzes) to yield an oil (raw shale oil), gas, and residual carbon
which remains in the shale. The total solid residue from retorting is
known as spent shale. Typical "rich" U.S. shales under consideration
yield about 25 to 40 gallons of raw shale oil per ton of rock heated.
1Whitcombe, J.A., et al. "Shale Oil Production Costs and the Need for
Incentives for Pioneer Plant Construction", TOSCO, Feb. 1-3, 1976.
5Research has been done on other ways of recovering shale oil from
its rock, for example by extraction with solvents or by the action of
microorganisms. But no method other than heating has shown any real
potential for commercial application.
The retorting of oil shale may be done in two general ways:
above-ground and in-situ. For above-ground retorting, the shale rock is
mined, crushed to appropriate sizes, and heated in steel vessels of
various configurations located on the surface. For in-situ retorting the
shale rock is heated while it remains underground.1 Many variations of
both above-ground and in-situ retorting have been investigated. Each
variation has its advantages and disadvantages. No variation has been
tested on a commercial scale in the United States although both
above-ground and in-situ processes have been operated commercially
abroad; no domestic shale oil project has ever exceeded 700-800 B/D--a
number which can be compared with our current oil imports of 7-8,000,000
B/D.
Regardless of the retorting method used, the resulting raw shale oil
is ordinarily "upgraded" to reduce contaminants--nitrogen, sulfur, and
metals--so that it may then be processed further by the same techniques
used to process crude petroleum.
The relatively small amount of oil recovered--roughly 10-15% by
weight of the shale rock heated--means that there are substantial
technical problems resulting from the sheer volume of rock that must be
mined and transported to a commercial-scale processing plant which uses
'Occidental Petroleum's Modified In-Situ process, however, requires at
least 20% of the shale resource to be mined and brought to the surface
where it can be retorted conventionally.
6above-ground retorting. Furthermore, since the shale expands by as much
as 50% during crushing and retorting, the volume of spent shale to be
disposed of is greater than the volume of shale that was mined. Spent
shale also often has a high content of alkaline minerals, a factor that
must be considered in the disposal process. Interest in in-situ
retorting stems largely from the fact that in-situ processes can avoid
handling most or all of the shale rock and spent shale handled in
above-ground processes.
Oil shale processing currently requires about one to four barrels of
water per barrel of shale oil produced. This water is used in the shale
processing itself as well as for dust control but the largest single
amount, up to half or more of the total, is usually for environmentally
acceptable disposal and revegetation of the spent shale. Water
availability is a problem in the arid shale regions of the West, and
opinions about its importance as a constraint on production are often
expressed with intense emotion. As a result, one typical conclusion is
that "...water is estimated to be the single most limiting restraint (on
shale production)." 1 However, the same source points out that Colorado
water can be desalinated for about 5/barrel;2 at the extreme limit,
fresh water can be brought to the area from 1000 miles away for well
under $1/barrel.3 Also, there are other tradeoffs between cost and
1Ramsey, W.J. et al, "Institutional Constraints and the Potential for
Shale Oil Development," Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, UCRL-52468, July
6, 1978, p. 24.
2Ibid., p. 16.
3Probstein, R.F. and Gold H., Water in Synthetic Fuel Production,
M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1978, p. b.
level of water consumption. Thus, the cost of water is significant but
need not be an absolute economic barrier if the institutional barriers
are overcome.
1.4 THE EVOLUTIONARY VIEW AND THE IN-PLACE VIEW
As would be expected, shale oil studies in both the private and
public sectors have emphasized what we will call here an "evolutionary"
or project approach. Costs are estimated for a single plant, looking at
that plant as a totality within itself, not part of a complex, an
industrial park, or a shale oil industry. It is not clear whether this
oversimplification tends to result in costs that are too high or too low
on the average for a whole industry.
In some ways, the first is the cheapest. For example, the highest
quality shale would be mined first, and the lowest-cost water would be
used first; local environmental pollution would be lowest with the first
plants; demand for labor and steel would be limited and would not drive
up price levels. However, other economies would result from the
existence of a cluster of plants. For example, a separate grass-roots
community need not be built for each plant--one larger (lower unit cost)
community could serve several plants; product transportation costs would
be lower for an industry pipeline than for any mode scaled for a single
plant; unit equipment manufacturing costs would be lower if many units
were replicated.
This latter set of possibilities encourages us to raise the question
of the economics of an industry, once in place. Might not a shale oil
industry be the beneficiary of economies that simply would not be
applicable to a single plant, and therefore have not been considered
8seriously in studies to date? Might these economies be significant?
Might an industry be viable whereas a plant or a few plants might not
be? Investigating the fruitfulness of this line of thinking is the
purpose of this study. The questions we are asking are the questions one
might ask when reflecting on, say, U.S. shipbuilding dynamics early in
World War II. The decision to build several Liberty ships a week
resulted in structural and technical changes that permitted economies
that simply were not possible when shipbuilding was considered a
one-at-a-time process.
1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This study is the first phase of what may evolve into a longer and
more ambitious program. At this point, our objectives have been to:
1. Define a study which has not already been done, which can be
done with the resources available, and which might contribute
to our understanding of the potential for a large shale oil
industry. The study defined is an examination of the economic
advantages possible through technology in a large in-place
industry.
2. Discuss the study objective with people knowledgeable about
shale oil. We have talked to shale experts in industry and
government and have gotten encouragement to proceed, but with
frequent reminders that it may be very difficult or impossible
to get from "here" to "there" (the large-place industry),
regardless of how economically attractive "there" seems to be.
3. Collect existing publicly available information on the costs of
producing shale oil by currently contemplated methods, in order
9to help identify areas in which a large-scale industry could
have major impact on costs. This report summarizes the
information we have obtained.
4. Plan and conduct a workshopl involving experts in both oil
shale and shale-applicable technology to identify opportunities
that could have a significant impact on unit costs in a
large-scale industry, e.g. mining technology, transportation
methods, equipment manufacturing.
In order to focus on the issue we want to consider, we will not
study in this first phase a number of other important issues despite our
recognition that these other issues may be controlling in the development
of a shale oil industry in the United Sates.
o We will not consider how the industry got built, but will
rather consider it already in place at steady state; in
chemical terms, we are concerned with equilibrium rather than
kinetics.
o We are looking only at the economic consequences of
technological alternatives; we are not evaluating other
alternatives, financial or tax devices for example, to reduce
cost.
o We are not reevaluating process economics, nor are we trying to
make fine comparisons among various competing processes; we
have made an effort to obtain the latest data available from
the most active players, accepting their data at face value.
1That workshop was held on June 4-5, 1979 in Lexington, Massachusetts.
A summary of that workshop is reported by the authors in "Shale Oil:
Potential Economies of Large-Scale Production, Workshop Phase", Energy
Laboratory Report No. MIT-EL 79-031WP, July 1979.
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o We assume that the environmental specifications which must be
met are those presently established.
o We are not taking account of unique project features
inapplicable on a large scale, for example, the recovery for
sale of alkaline minerals along with the shale.
o As noted previously, we are not comparing shale oil to other
alternatives for reducing oil imports.
o We are not evaluating current or potential government policies
affecting shale.
In other words, for the moment we are deliberately taking a narrow
technologist's view of the potential for reducing costs through
technology in a large distant-future shale oil industry.
1.6 THE STUDY, THE INDUSTRY, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Industry is being clear, as demonstrated by both its behavior and
its public statements, that it does not regard shale oil ventures as
attractive now. Industry dissatisfaction is most frequently expressed
about the "non-economic" barriers--innumerable permits, changing
environmental regulations, tax and pricing uncertainties, lease
limitations, water rights conflicts, legal challenges, and so on--but the
crucial barrier is the fact that shale oil simply costs more than
imported oil now. If shale oil cost less, we would probably see more
determined and more successful efforts by both industry and government to
surmount the non-economic barriers. ("Non-economic" is shorthand, of
course; there are costs, often large ones, resulting from those barriers.)
Industry's continued interest in shale oil, despite its current
unattractiveness, is sustained primarily by the belief that the real cost
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of imported oil will continue to rise, ultimately catching up to and then
surpassing shale oil at some unpredictable future date. Government
assistance is sought by industry before that date on the grounds that a)
there is a public value, which cannot be directly captured by a company
undertaking a shale oil venture now, in reducing imported oil--for
reasons discussed at the start of this introduction, and b) we need to
start now if we want to have significant shale oil production in place
when the cost curves do intersect.
A secondary reason for industry's continued interest is the belief
that the real cost of producing shale oil may be reduced through
technological improvement.1 That belief raises the issue of how the
process of technological change occurs, and what the consequences might
be for two different paths of the shale oil industry. One set of
consequences would result from the industry following the usual
evolutionary path, and one would result from the industry-in-place path
described in the preceding section.
It is convenient to think of technological change occurring in five
stages termed: 1. Invention, 2. Development, 3. Introduction, 4.
Diffusion, and 5. Maturity. These stages are described in detail in
Appendix A. The normal evolution of technology--shale oil technology as
well as other technologies--would progress through each of these stages.
Thus, a shale oil industry in a Maturity phase would make use of those
mining, retorting, and upgrading technologies which had proved superior
1There are quite different views on the prospects for reducing cost
through improvement of current technologies. For example, Merrow
("Constraints on the Commercialization of Oil Shale," Rand/R-2293-DOE,
September 1978) is pessimistic but Hutchins ("Oil Shale 1979," presented
at the Twelfth Annual Oil Shale Symposium, April 1979) is optimistic.
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to competing technologies during extended commercial-scale operation in
the Introduction and early Diffusion phases.
If an industry were put in place in some unspecified way, the
Introduction and early Diffusion phases would be skipped. As Appendix A
points out, the primary purpose of those phases is to narrow the range of
cost uncertainty rather than to reduce the probable cost, although
technical changes which result in reduced (or increased) cost certainly
occur in those phases. Thus, the later Diffusion and Maturity phases
would be entered with less certainty that the best technologies were
being used.
A crucial question to be faced is the probability of the economies
of an industry in place being greater than the diseconomies of skipping
some intermediate stages. In general, the economies that might result
from the industry-in-place approach fall into two categories. One is the
economy of scale. An industry can solve problems more economically than
individual plants and can justify the development of technology not
otherwise supportable. Examples of economy-of-scale savings would
include (as illustrations, not proposals):
o Mining. All or much of the Piceance Creek basin might be
open-pit mined, with the resulting oil shale distributed to
individual retorting sites.
o Combinations. An industry basis might better accommodate an
optimum balance between surface and in situ retorting.
o Infrastructure. An industry might support larger, more
economical cities.
o Transportation. Pipelining product out, say to existing
refineries, might offer cost savings.
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o Spent shale disposal may be more economical on an industry
basis.
o Environmental Impact Statement. A simple EIS for the entire
industry may well be more cost-effective than separate studies
and statements for each plant.
o Environmental control (e.g., particulates, NOx, SO2) may be
more economical for an industry.
o Water supply and disposal could be much more practical for an
industry, through such means as bringing in water from remote
sources.
The other possible source of cost reduction lies in the dimension of
mass production economies for the suppliers to the shale oil industry.
If suppliers were to know and could count on the construction of an
industry of, say, 5,000,000 bbl./day over a relatively short time frame,
say 8 to 15 years, then perhaps economies could be realized through the
planned mass production of retorts, mining machinery, pipe and valves,
etc.
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2. THE COSTS OF PRODUCING SHALE OIL
Generating reliable cost estimates is difficult for any large energy
facility. The Shoreham nuclear plant on Long Island was estimated to
cost $261 million in 1969 with a completion date of 1975. Present
estimates indicate a cost of $1.3 billion and a completion date of 1980.
The ratio of actual final cost to original estimate was still higher for
the Alaskan pipeline, vividly illustrating the hazards of cost estimating
of even "old" (i.e., pipeline) technology in a wholly new environment.
Estimating the costs of an oil shale complex is attended by an
additional set of difficulties due to the infant nature of the industry.
Fundamental questions with pioneer complexes are whether the various
components of such facilities will function well together and
continuously when erected on a commercial scale, and whether the impacts
on a sensitive environment will be acceptable without further costs.
Semi-works operations and tests provide limited information. Even if the
facility is of sound engineering design, lack of experience about its
construction and operation make it highly probable that unexpected costs
will arise.
In relying upon published cost estimates, as we rely, there are
additional uncertainties. We rarely can find out enough about the detail
and recency of the estimates to judge their credibility. A 19781 study
of the history of cost estimates for producing shale oil shows startling
increases in those estimates since 1970. (It is customary and
comforting, but not necessarily prudent, to assume that now we are a lot
smarter than we used to be and therefore that current estimates are
1Merrow, op. cit.
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close to the "truth.") In addition, the assumptions are not always fully
specified so that comparisons with other shale oil technologies, much
less technologies for other sources of energy, are often unreliable;
different sets of estimates use different assumptions about taxes, costs
of capital, water, community needs, and so on in addition to the
differences in basic technology.
In summary, because of the general difficulties inherent in
estimating costs, the additional problems of costing pioneer plants, and
the differences in basic assumptions and comprehensiveness, conclusions
based on published cost estimates are the subject of much confusion.
We have not emphasized the confusion in order to reduce the
significance of such estimates. Rather, by identifying the types of
problems that arise in estimating costs, we are explaining the need to
characterize costs over a range of probability. Accordingly, this
section attempts to perform two tasks:
(1) to review available industry cost estimates, put them in
comparable forms, and generate average industry cost estimates;
all costs are expressed in late-1978 dollars per barrel of
"syncrude" produced and thus the cost calculations make
assumptions about yields in each step of the total process
sequence.
(2) to consider those estimates in light of the problems outlined
above and to perform a simple sensitivity analysis using a few
important parameters in order to provide a range of costs with
associated probabilities.
The estimates include total costs for syncrude plus costs for each
of the three major sections of the total process: solids preparation and
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disposal (including lease acquisition, mining, crushing, spent shale
disposal, and revegetation); retorting of crushed rock to raw shale oil;
and upgrading of raw shale oil to a refinery-acceptable feed. Each major
section is charged with its share of common facilities, and each section
is assumed to include those control facilities required to conform to
presently established environmental regulations.
Where possible, we have separated total costs into capital charges
and operating costs. Capital charges include allowance for return on
total investment, depreciation, start-up costs, income tax, construction
time, etc. Capital charges were assumed to equal about 28% of total
all-equity investment annually for a 15% return, and about 15% annually
for a 10% return.
The cost estimates are, unfortunately, confined to surface retorting
processes. Only Occidental has carried out enough work on any type of
in-situ process to back up a meaningful commercial-scale cost estimate,
and Occidental's cost estimates are not available to us. The most recent
public DOE estimates1 place the costs of vertical modified in-situ
(i.e., Occidental-process) shale oil at $15-25/barrel and surface retort
shale oil at $20-30/barrel; the DOE in-situ numbers are not based on
detailed engineering design, to the best of our knowledge.
2.1 SOLIDS PREPARATION AND DISPOSAL
The costs included in this section are the costs required to:
- acquire the lease,
1Commercialization Strategy Report for Oil Shale: Part II, 1978, DOE
Task Force (H.D. Guthrie, Chairman), TID-28845.
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- mine the shale rock,
- crush the rock to a feed acceptable to the particular retort
used, and
- dispose of the spent shale and revegetate it.
Appendix B describes the sources of our cost data in detail. Lease
acquisition costs per barrel were assumed equal to those of the Colony
project. Costs of the other steps were based on averages of estimates by
Colony, Cameron Engineers, and Paraho. All those estimates assumed 100%
underground mining; we adjusted the estimates by assuming that 15% of the
industry's shale rock would be mined by open-pit methods at a total cost
equal to 60% of the cost of underground mining. DOE's estimate is that
less than 20% of oil shale areas are minable by open pit methods.1
In order to calculate how the costs might vary with changes in some
important parameters, we also made the following assumptions:
Parameter Value Probability
DCF Return 15% 0.7
10% 0.3
Shale Richness 35 gal/ton 0.8
25 gal/ton 0.2
Retort Recovery 100% of F.A.2 0.7
80% of F.A. 0.3
Figure 1 displays the results of our calculations, presented on
cumulative probability coordinates. For example, the total cost of
solids preparation and disposal has an 80% probability of exceeding $7, a
50% probability of exceeding $9, and a 20% probability of exceeding $11.
1Department of Energy, "Oil Shale Technology," February 1978, p. 25.
2Fischer Assay. This parameter affects the amount of rock that must be
mined and retorted to produce a barrel of oil.
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For our purposes, and reflecting our confidence in the input data and
assumptions, precision much better than the nearest dollar is not
justified.
The median total of $9 is composed of:
Capital charges 6 Lease acquisition 2
Operating costs 3 Mining, crushing, disposal,
Total 9 and revegetation 7
Total 9
Different retorting processes incur different crushing costs and use
different techniques for disposal and revegetation of spent shale. We do
not have data to separate those costs easily. A reasonable guess for
industry-wide average costs would be $4 for mining, $1 for crushing, and
$2 for spent shale disposal and revegetation.
2.2 RETORTING
The costs included in this section are the costs required to:
- recover raw shale oil from heated crushed rock
- use, sell, or acceptably dispose of all gaseous and other liquid
streams
- burn carbon on and recover heat from spent shale (if included)
Appendix B describes the sources of our cost data in detail. Costs
were based on weighted average estimates for the Colony (Tosco), Paraho,
Union, and Lurgi retorting systems.
In order to calculate how costs might vary with changes in some
important retorting parameters, we made the following assumptions:
Parameter
DCF Return
Shale Richness
Retort Recovery
Annual Throughput
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Value
15%
10%
35 gal/ton
25 gal/ton
100% of F.A.
80% of F.A.
1.7x Design
1.3 "
1.1 "
1.0 "
0.9 "
0.5 "
Probability
0.7
0.3
0.8
0.2
0.7
0.3
0.01
0.05
0.15
0.6
0.15
0.04
The throughput in effect lumps together on a calendar day basis the
design service factor and the design stream day capacity.
Figure 2 displays the results, again plotted on cumulative
probability coordinates. The total cost of retorting has an 80%
probability of exceeding $8, a 50% probability of exceeding $10, and a
20% probability of exceeding $13.
The median cost of $10 is comprised of about $7 in capital charges
and about $3 in operating costs.
Most of the retorting systems proposed can be designed in several
variations which, for example, affect the quantity and quality of net
fuel gas produced, or which recover heat by burning carbon on the spent
shale. However, the unit shale oil costs from these more complex
retorting systems are not significantly lower than from the simpler
systems.
21
Figure 2: Cost of Retorting
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2.3 UPGRADING
The costs included in this section are the costs required to:
- reduce nitrogen and metals (e.g. arsenic) in raw shale oil to
levels permitting further processing to marketable products by
customary petroleum refinery techniques
- make marketable byproducts (usually ammonia and sulfur) as a
logical consequence of the upgrading process; byproduct values
are credited against upgrading costs.
Appendix B describes the sources of our cost data in detail. Costs
were based on upgrading estimates prepared by Colony, Paraho, and
Chevron. A significant uncertainty--not quantified--that results from
averaging the three sets of costs arises from the fact that the degree of
upgrading, i.e. the severity of hydrogenation, differs among the three
cases.
We made the same assumptions about DCF returns that we did for the
solids and retorting sections and we assumed an overall cost (for each
level of return) probability as follows:
Parameter Value Probability
DCF Return 15% 0.7
10% 0.3
Total cost 1.5 x design 0.05
(at each 1.25 " 0.2
return) 1.0 " 0.5
0.75 " 0.2
0.5 " 0.05
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We chose a distribution of overall costs rather than selected
operating parameters because we believe that--even if no new technology
is developed--a large scale shale oil industry will upgrade in some
manner that is better integrated with other refining facilities than the
isolated brute-force hydrogenation currently assumed in most shale oil
project estimates. With closer refining integration, the process design
for upgrading and the quality of upgraded oil are likely to be different
than now assumed. Lacking any sound way to isolate the specific
'parameters that may change, we resorted to a distribution of overall cost
probability that seems reasonable for this type of hydrogenation
technology.
Figure 3 displays the results. The total cost of upgrading has an
80% probability of exceeding $3.5, a 50% probability of exceeding $5, and
a 20% probability of exceeding $6.5. For the median total cost of $5,
about $4 are capital charges and about $1 is net operating cost.
2.4 TOTAL COSTS
A probability distribution for the total costs of shale syncrude was
calculated by combining all the individual cases computed for the three
separate sections described in 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. The results are shown
in Figure 4.
Under the assumptions stated previously, there is a 50% probability
that total costs will exceed about $23/barrel. Extending the probability
range to cover from 20 to 80% results in a range of costs from 18 to 28
dollars per barrel. Not surprisingly, the curve is skewed to show that
the small chance of very high costs is greater than the small chance of
very low costs. Capital charges again dominate, accounting for about 70%
of the total.
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Figure 4: Total Cost of Shale Syncrude
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Although our estimates of the uncertainty in cost may seem large,
the true uncertainty is probably even larger. For example, we have not
included uncertainty in the basic cost estimates even for a project with
all parameters fixed. And, we have considered only a few of the
variables. Therefore, even if we have exaggerated the uncertainties in
the variables we did consider, the total true uncertainties remain large.
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3. CONCLUSIONS
Currently the most popular view in the shale oil industry is that
surface-retorted syncrude can be produced at a total cost roughly in the
middle of the $20-30/barrel range. Our view of the data supports that
consensus. A combination of favorable circumstances can result in lower
costs for a particular project. But the total uncertainties suggest that
industry-average costs for large-scale production are at least as likely
to go up as go down if the industry moves along the normal evolutionary
path.
The probable cost of shale oil is still substantially higher than
the cost of landed imported petroleum. If the real price of crude
increases at 5% per year, it will reach $25 in about 7 years, making
shale oil reasonably competitive without subsidy at that time. No
significant (in supply terms) rate of production of shale oil could be
achieved in the United States within seven years short of a national
effort comparable to some World War II activities.
The largest single component of cost of shale oil is retorting, but
surface retorting costs are less than half of total costs. No potential
breakthrough in surface retorting costs is under development (to our
knowledge), and a revolutionary breakthrough would be required to have a
major impact on total costs, since mining and upgrading costs would
probably be unaffected.
In-situ technology has both its pointers-with-pride and its
viewers-with-alarm. The pointers-with-pride hold forth the prospects of
significant reduction of both cost and environmental problems, compared
to surface retorting. Perhaps they will be proved correct, and most
people agree that further R&D is well justified. But none of the three
quasi-commercial scale tests conducted by Occidental to date has proved
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much more than technical feasibility.
A conspicuous feature of shale oil cost is its dependence on capital
charges--65-80% of the total cost. A would-be investor in the industry
is faced by the need to assemble large blocks of capital ($1 billion or
so per commercial-scale plant) and spend it all up front--with attendant
large risks or costs or both due to construction delays, permit or
litigation delays, regulatory changes, engineering design deficiencies,
or other factors that prevent or impede plant production and revenue
generation. The capital charge must include a return on investment
consistent with these risks in addition to other uncertainties (like the
price of competitive fuels or any of the major government policies
affecting the industry).
How can costs be reduced, by other than financial or tax devices?
For an individual project, there are the obvious technology-independent
advantages of richer, more accessible shale ore, adequate water, and
waste disposal opportunities; and there are the obvious
technology-dependent advantages of increased recovery and throughput,
waste streams of minimum undesirability, and byproducts of maximum
value. For the industry as a whole, technology may be able to provide
further opportunities as described in Section 1.6 above.
A workshop convened by MIT was held on June 4-5, 1979, to identify
some of those opportunities.l
The consensus of the workshop participants (from industry and MIT), most
of whom were specifically expert in shale or shale-applicable technology,
was optimism about the ability of improved technology to reduce the cost
of producing shale oil on a very large scale.
1See footnote, page 9.
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APPENDIX A. THE PROCESS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
by Ben C. Ball, Jr.
A.1 THE NATURE OF THE PROCESS
In order to evaluate properly the trade-offs in the "evolutionary"
vs the "industry in place" alternatives, it is helpful to establish first
a clear view of how new technologies are in fact commercialized in the
United States.
Commercialization of a new technology occurs if it is available at a
cost allowing the private sector an acceptable return on the total
capital required, given the market prices of inputs, capital, and labor,
given the regulatory restrictions, and given the marketplace.
A way in which this real-world process can be perceived is through
the existence of four rather discrete stages which precede the
establishment of a mature industry:
- Research or invention
- Development or demonstration
- Commercial introduction
- Commercial diffusion.
Invention is the generation of an idea. A functioning process or
product is established. Economic issues are not dealt with in depth at
this stage; technical, market, and regulatory uncertainties are very
high. Costs, prices, and markets are usually poorly known.
In the development stage, design is optimized until the process or
product is embodied in an actual model within a working environment. The
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principal function of this stage is to eliminate essentially
technological uncertainty and thus determine the expected cost of mature
production (e.g., production following the diffusion stage). However,
the variance of this expected future cost may be rather high. This stage
deals not at all with market or regulatory uncertainties.
The development stage need not, and in fact usually does not,
require the construction of a full-scale production facility. Pilot
plant is the usual approach here. The product may be real-life (e.g., a
barrel of real shale oil), so that the product may be tested, but the
production facilities are expected to be smaller than full size by virtue
of our ability to scale. If they are readily scalable, then there are no
significant technical uncertainties which require commercial-scale
construction for their resolution. If a crucial sub-unit is not readily
scalable, an alternative to a full-scale demonstration plant is to build
a facility only of the crucial sub-unit, no larger than necessary to
resolve the relevant technical uncertainties.
The purpose of the development stage is, thus, twofold:
- To reduce technological uncertainty
- To determine expected mature costs.
At the end of this stage, variance of the mature costs will be
rather high. However, the expected value of this cost has been
determined. If this cost is too high to offer adequate hope of profit
(i.e., to offer hope that the technology will be commercialized), or, if
the cost necessary to commercialize lies within the variance but at an
inadequately low probability, then the techology is not commercial. The
project is dropped, or perhaps the invention stage is reentered.
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The development stage is not primarily intended to reduce costs.
Rather, it determines them, within a broad range, given the output of the
invention stage. It deals not at all with market or regulatory
uncertainties.
It is the introduction stage that deals primarily with these issues,
while further narrowing the range of cost variance. It is here that
full-scale production facilities are put into operation in order to
reduce market uncertainties (e.g., marketing programs, distribution
channels, maintenance organizations, market segmentation and
differentiation, character of the technology and of the industry, and the
value of mystique) and regulatory and legislative uncertainties (e.g.,
environmental, tax, delays).
It is only after these cost, market, and regulatory uncertainties
have been reduced during the introduction stage that the diffusion stage
is considered. The diffusion stage is marked by widespread production in
a growing number of full-scale production facilities, widespread usage
and (normally) the entry of competitors. Actual costs begin to decrease
as experience is gained.
What is the driving force for this process? Clearly, it is pursuit
of economic gain by the individual actors in the private sector. This
might best be viewed as a series of investment decisions, one before each
of the four stages.
- The decision to conduct research is a decision to invest in the
possibility of an option to "develop" a new idea, should one be
forthcoming.
- The decision to "develop" a new idea is a decision to invest in
an option to "introduce" a new product or process, should the
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development stage indicate it technically feasible at
attractive probable cost.
- The decision to "introduce" is a decision to invest in an
option to "diffuse" should the market, regulatory, and cost
issues addressed in the introduction stage indicate favorable
resolution.
At no point in the process has a "profit" been made or have cash flows
been positive, even undiscounted. Even the introduction stage is not
normally expected to be profitable in its own right, though some revenues
may obtain. Rather, it is another in a series of investments.
- The decision to diffuse is the decision to invest in multiple
full-scale facilities and in market share, with the expectation
of "profit" - that is, within the planning horizon, the
discounted cash flows will be positive, including the
investment in the three earlier stages.1 At the point of the
diffusion stage, technical uncertainties are nil, market and
regulatory uncertainties have been reduced to manageable
levels, and costs are known with a relatively high degree of
certainty. The significant uncertainty is competitive action,
which would affect individual actors in the process more than
the progress of the process itself.
Should the reduction of market, regulatory, and cost uncertainty
achieved during the introduction stage indicate a low probability of
profitable diffusion, then obviously the process would stop, or be
1A complicating factor is the fact that, at the point of the diffusion
decision, investments in prior stages are sunk costs.
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delayed until a significant change occurred in one of the key elements.
In the latter case, the type of the change would indicate the stage in
which it occurred, and therefore, the succeeding stage in which the
process would pick up, for example:
- New idea (new technology) - introduction. Redevelop, etc.
- Lower cost-introduction/development. Reintroduce.
- New market or regulatory climate. Reintroduce or diffuse.
One would correctly expect the magnitude of the investment to
increase significantly from invention through diffusion to maturity. The
successful invention (i.e., one that is eventually "commercialized")
normally has minuscule costs relative to the investment in the mature,
diffused industry. Even the investment in "introduction" is very small
relative to diffusion investment. And, in most cases, the cost of each
stage (including introduction) is not recovered during that stage. "If
when examined at the end of its development, a technology appears to be
commercial in the long run, it usually will be introduced and
'commercialized' by the private sector."l
The cost of successful invention, development, and introduction are,
thus, small relative to that of diffusion. One might say that it is the
unsuccessful ones that are expensive. Viewed as a whole, the successful
ones must more than pay for the unsuccessful. This is usually viewed in
the private sector as "risk", and is thought of, not as an added
1Jacoby, H.D., Lawrence H. Linden, et al., "Government Support for the
Commercialization of New Energy Technologies - An Analysis and
Exploration of the Issues", Policy Study Group, MIT Energy Laboratory
Report MIT-EL 76-009, Cambridge, MA. November 1976. (Prepared for ERDA
under Contract No. E49-18 2295.).
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cost, but rather as the expected return necessary to justify "taking the
risk", i.e., making the investments in invention, development, and
introduction.
An additional word needs to be said about the declining costs in the
mature phase following diffusion, as experience is accumulated. It has
been found1 for a wide variety of products and a wide variety of
industries that costs (in constant dollars) decline through experience as
the product matures. This is a well-known phenomenon for the
manufacturing process ("the learning curve"); the principle applies
similarly to the total infrastructure, i.e., manufacturing, management,
distribution, marketing, etc. (the "experience curve"). This cost
reduction is a function of the number of comparable units produced, and
is expected to amount to a 20-30% reduction for each doubling of
accumulated experience. On a log-log plot, the curve is a straight line,
with a slope of 70-80%.2
Several characteristics of this phenomenon are important to note
here:
- The early points on the plot are scattered, and do not begin to
take form until the system as a whole becomes organized and
routine, well into the diffusion stage.
- Largely, each firm follows its own experience curve. For
example, if firm X led the diffusion phase and had progressed
down the experience curve in Figure A-1 to point C at the point
1Allan, Gerald B. "Note on the Use of Experience Curves in Competitive
Decision Making", Intercollegiate Case Clearing House #9-175-174.
Boston, 1975.
2See Figure A-1.
"75% Slope"
(i.e., costs fall 25% for
each doubling of accumulated
experience)
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in time firm Y decided to become a competitor, the latter would
enter at, say, point B.
The implications of these characteristics are significant:
- In a fragmented industry (i.e., many equal competitors) all
competitors would follow the experience curve more or less
together. Prices would be expected to follow the dotted line,
with the ordinal difference between the solid and dotted lines
representing "profit" or return on total investment. Under
these conditions, a firm is not likely to diffuse unless this
ordinal difference is positive at or very near the beginning of
the diffusion stage.
- If one firm were to adopt an aggressive pricing strategy, it
might become the initiator of diffusion at point B, but price
along the dashed line in order to dominate the market. Only at
point A in experience would it begin to break even on current
production, but at point C in experience it could begin
reducing prices more sharply and remain profitable. Of course,
the incentive for such a strategy would be increased profit
(e.g., higher present value of net cash flows, properly
discounted for the time value of money and for risk), due to
"investment in market share".
One of the principal strategic reasons for a firm investing in
invention, development, and introduction is to give it "a head start down
the learning curve", i.e., more accumulated experience, and therefore
lower unit costs than competition during diffusion. Strategically, this
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would lead to a dominant market share as maturity is reached.1 (Other
strategies are open to competition.) Either market failure or inadequate
expected profit would prevent a firm from adopting this particular
marketing strategy.
A.2 A SUMMARY VIEW
Figure A-2 presents a summary view of the process of technological
change as outlined above.
- Invention is the generation of a new idea, with little
knowledge of costs or of technical, market, or regulatory
uncertainties. An investment represents an option to develop.
- Development is the design optimization of the idea until it is
embodied in an actual model that will perform in the working
environment.
- Purpose: essentially eliminate technological uncertainty,
and get an idea of the cost. In the language of the
"Commercialization" paper,2 mature cost C(X) is
estimated, but with high variance Gi(C(X)).
- Market and regulatory uncertainties are not dealt with.
- Criteria of success: a product which management can
expect to sell at a profit.
1Allen, Gerald B., "A Note on the Boston Consulting Group Concept of
Competitive Analysis and Corporate Strategy", Intercollegiate Case
Clearing House #9-175-175, Boston, 1975.
2op. cit., p.108.
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- Investment: option to introduce.
- Introduction is the establishment of initial full-scale
production facilities, marketing programs, distribution channels,
maintenance organizations, etc.
- Purpose: reduce market and regulatory uncertainty.
- Cost: determined as C*(X*), reducing the variance of C(X)
from Gi(C(X)) to Gd(C(X)).
- Criteria of success: not profit, but option to diffuse
profitably.
- Diffusion is widespread production and use, usually accompanied
by the entry of competitors.
- Purpose: profit, sometimes accompanied by a strategy to
dominate the market.
- Cost: C(X) is determined, and the slope of the experience
curve C(X) = f(X), is established.
- As maturity is approached each competitor progresses down
his own learning curve.
Thus, each stage performs its own function. For example, if the cost of
a particular technology emerging from the development stage is expected
to be noncompetitive, the indication is to invent a new technology, not
introduce the noncompetitive one. Similarly, if technology emerging from
introduction does not appear profitable, the indication is to invent a
new one, not diffuse the unprofitable one.
A.3 AN INTERPRETATION
At the present time, even those enthusiastic about proceeding with
the construction and operation of full-scale shale oil plants expect the
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cost to exceed competitive prices (i.e., the world oil price). Their
argument for proceeding is based on the need to reduce uncertainties
(whether technological or regulatory), and to have the plants ready when
competitive prices rise to the level of their costs. Most of those who
make these arguments believe that a government subsidy of some form
(e.g., special tax treatment) is appropriate in order to provide private
incentive for the construction of these plants.
The description of the process of technological change is useful in
interpreting these arguments. We are now at the "development" stage; the
cost uncertainty is high, but is expected to exceed break-even prices.
As displayed on Figure A-3, at the Development stage, probable cost is
greater than break-even cost, C(X)> C(BE). This analysis indicates the
technology is simply not viable. Effort is indicated at the Invention
stage, to develop a lower-cost technology. If technological risk is too
high, effort is indicated at the Development (pilot plant) stage, not at
the Introduction ("demonstration") stage. Effort at the Introduction
stage is possibly appropriate to reduce regulatory uncertainty;1
however, the purpose of doing so is not clear as long as the expected
cost exceeds break-even, even after reducing the uncertainty. The
argument for government subsidy or incentives would hinge on a
demonstration that the private discount rate exceeds the public, or that
the social value of shale oil exceeds the market value (or, perhaps, the
existence of some other form of market failure). That is to say, if the
break-even price is to rise from C(BE) to C(BE') over some time frame,
1However, it needs to be emphasized that there are alternative methods
for reducing regulatory risk which may well be much more cost-effective.
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then investment in Introduction/Diffusion may well be economically
attractive now, even at C(X), depending on the discount rate. The
question raised by this analysis is, if the investment is not attractive
to the private sector now, how is it attractive to the public?
The process of technological change is normally driven by the
expectation that C(X) C(BE), the difference representing the
possibility of a profit. (This is represented on Figure A-3 as C(X)
C(BE').) This relation must hold for each phase in the process for
investment in the next phase to be attractive. If this relation does not
hold at any phase, then the process (properly) ceases.
A.4 THE SHAKEDOWN PERIOD
Introduction and Diffusion reduce uncertainty, not expected cost.
One of the ways in which this occurs is that, by simple trial and error,
marginally equivalent methods, technologies, processes, combinations, and
permutations are tried against each other, and the marginally best is
thereby identified. This begins to occur during the Introduction stage
and continues through the early Diffusion stage. Thus in shale oil, the
various approaches to retorting would compete against each other in the
real world, as would in-situ and modified in-situ; by the closing of the
Diffusion stage, industry would have learned the optimum process, the key
situational parameters, and how to obtain maximum profit, given any
particular set of circumstances.
An example here may be helpful. During World War II, catalytic
cracking of gas oil was discovered as a practical means of increasing the
yield of high-octane gasoline (i.e., avgas) from crude. At the end of
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the Development stage, three competing processes were identified: FCC,
TCC, and HCC.1 Any of the three was far superior to none, but it was
not clear which was the best of the three. Therefore, all three competed
in the real world, and by the middle of the Diffusion stage, the FCC was
found to be superior to the two competing approaches in all
applications. That is to say, against a refinery without catalytic
cracking, any of the three processes was highly attractive. However,
against a refinery with FCC, the other two were very unattractive.
The point here is that the cost advantage of FCC over TCC or HCC is
an order of magnitude less than the cost advantage of any of the three
processes over no catalytic cracking at all. Applying this point to
shale oil, we can see that, as far as the process of technological change
is concerned, the important issue is the range of expected costs of any
of the competing processes, relative to expected break-even cost. This
is illustrated on Figure A-4, which compares the expected costs of
Processes A, B, and C with the break-even cost C(BE'). The process of
technological change depends on CA(X), CB(X), and Cc(X) relative to
C(BE'), not relative to each other. However, during the shakedown period
of the process of technological change, the uncertainties of CA(X),
CB(X), and Cc(X) relative to each other are reduced significantly,
and the appropriate processes are sorted out from the competing ones.
A.5 "EXPERIENCE" COST REDUCTION
It is important to distinguish this "sorting out" during the
shakedown period from the cost reductions which occur during maturity.
1Fluid catalytic cracking, Thermofor catalytic cracking, and Houdry
catalytic cracking, respectively.
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The former is the determination of which process, technique, etc., is
most cost-effective. Once this has been determined, then this knowledge
becomes the basis for the rest of the Diffusion stage and for the
Maturity stage. It is only after the established process, technique,
etc., has become repetitive that the continuing cost reduction of the
"experience curve"1 become applicable. Thus, the shakedown period is
one of cost determination, by selecting the marginally optimum process,
while the experience curve effects continuing cost reduction, resulting
from the accumulation of experience in repeating the same functions.
These two dynamics are not only different in both nature and in
consequences, they are also separated in time. In fact, at any single
point in time, they are, by definition, mutually exclusive.
A.6 APPLICABILITY TO THIS STUDY
Having proposed a model for understanding the process of
technological change, and having analyzed the present shale oil industry
through the framework of this model, hopefully now we should be able to
articulate the question this study intends to raise in more precise and
succinct terms.
If an industry were to be put in place, as compared with evolving
through the process of technological change, then we would, in effect, be
jumping from the end of the Development stage to the end of the Diffusion
stage. Since we are focusing here on technological costs, the major
phase bypassed would be the shakedown period. Thus, a non-optimum
1As defined and discussed in Section A.1.
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process or technique may be the one selected for the industry in place.
To use again our World War II analogy from the refining industry, we
might have built a refining industry on the basis of the HCC process.
The question of this study is, then, what is the probability of the
economies of an industry in place being greater than the diseconomies of
skipping the shakedown period?
This question can be seen graphically on Figure A-4, if Processes A,
B, and C represent presently competing shale oil techniques, and C(BE)
represents the break-even cost of shale oil. What is the probability of
the cost of shale oil from an industry in place being less than C(BE),
even if Process C is chosen as the basis for the industry?
Our analytic framework permits asking this same question an
additional way. Note that in the process of technological change, cost
reductions occur at only the stages at each extreme of the process:
Introduction, on the one side, and Maturity, on the other. Thus,
normally, if a technology at the end of the Development stage has an
expected cost greater than C(BE), then the technology is abandoned. The
question here is, could the economies of an industry in place reduce the
expected cost from greater than break-even to less than break-even? This
is displayed graphically on Figure A-5.
This picture raises quite naturally the question about the possible
role of experience cost reduction (as this term is rather narrowly
defined in this paper). After all, this kind of cost reduction has
played a rather spectacular role in other industries, IC's being the
classic example. However, in the shale oil industry, such reductions are
not expected by anyone to be significant, principally for two reasons.
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In the first place, the dynamics of limited resources is expected to be
overwhelming from the very beginning. In the second place, none of the
components of the shale oil industry is new (i.e., mining, retorting,
materials handling); we are already so far down the learning curve on
each of them that additional accumulated experience within the shale oil
industry is expected to result in negligible cost reductions.
Thus, the picture of shale oil is basically one of continually
increasing, rather than decreasing, costs. Any viability at all depends,
not on increasing economies, but on increasing break-even costs (i.e.,
increasing world oil price). This is, in fact, a poorly understood
notion, and is contrary to most experience. There are no analytical
tools capable of dealing adequately with issues of marginal costs
exceeding average costs.1
Over against this, the question raised by this study is a rather
fundamental one: When viewed from the perspective of an industry in
place, are there possible economies not yet perceived, which might permit
costs to decline (in real terms) rather than to rise, over the long term?
1Ball, Ben C., Jr., "Energy: Policymaking in a New Reality",
Technology Review, October/November 1977.
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APPENDIX B: Estimating the Costs of Shale Oil Production
by Robert J. Barbera
B.1 Introduction
This appendix explains the approach employed to estimate the costs
of oil shale production. In particular, a review of available industry
cost estimates is performed, put in comparable forms and an average
industry cost estimate is generated using 4th quarter 1978 dollars.1
The approach taken involved five steps. First, Oil Shale Industry
representatives were consulted and the most recent relevant information
collected. Next, this information was evaluated and relevant cost
figures extracted; thirdly, each cost estimate's development was reviewed
and characterized in terms of its firmness. Fourthly, the different cost
estimates were adjusted to as close to equivalent forms as possible, and
then, taking into account the reliability of each estimate, a weighted
industry average cost was determined. Finally, Section 2 of the main
report explains the sensitivity analysis performed on the industry
average cost and provides a range of costs and associated probabilities.
Organization of Cost Estimates
Shale oil production was divided into the following component parts:
Mining for Surface Retorting
1To secure a DCFROR of 15% for a commercial shale venture, in
consideration of Federal and Colorado taxes, we estimate that an annual
capital charge of 28% of capital costs is required. Similarly for a 10%
DCFROR a 15% annual capital charge is needed.
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Surface Retorting
Upgrading
For each of these parts the following information appears:
(1) A brief process description
(2) A summary of the degree of testing and the success of
testing the process
(3) A qualitative description of the cost information available
(4) A table summarizing the cost estimates
B.2 MINING FOR SURFACE RETORTING
Introduction
There are two basic approaches to mining shale for surface
retorting, underground mining and open pit mining. The approach taken
depends of course upon the physical characteristics of the resources to
be mined. Although present open-pit mining technology can be applied to
some shale deposits close to the surface, much of the richer deposits are
deep and not presently amenable to this technique. For this report we
assume that 15% of the shale available can be mined in such a fashion.
Summary of Industry Cost Estimates
The cost to underground mine shale for surface retorting has been
addressed in a number of studies. Cameron Engineers provide an in-depth
evaluation of the costs of this technique.1 The study evaluates four
types of underground mining:
1Cameron Engineers, Inc., A Technical and Economic Study of Candidate
Underground Mining Systemsfor Deep, Thick Oil Shale Deposits, Bureau of
Mines, 11/76.
B-3
(1) Chamber and pillar
(2) Sublevel stoping with spent shale backfill
(3) Sublevel stoping with full subsidence
(4) Block caving
The Colony Development Operation, a planned 50,000 BPD commercial
facility also presents cost estimates for underground mining.1
Colony's figures are part of an Engineering Contractor's estimate
performed in order to evaluate the economic viability of their proposed
operation. Paraho, in the commercial evaluation of their process also
estimate the costs of mining.2 Finally, we used a rule-of-thumb
estimate that the cost of surface mining of shale is 60% of the cost of
underground mining.
Table B1 summarizes the cost figures for all these firms. These
costs have been adjusted to reflect the same shale resource (35 GPT) as
well as updated to reflect 4th quarter 1978 dollars.
Table B1 also contains a figure labeled the Industry Average Cost
Estimate. This figure, an average of the each of the estimates
presented, represents an estimate of the expected value of the cost of
mining shale (given the optimistic bias inherent in figures that assume
"all goes well"). In section 2.1 of the main text we identify parameters
that can affect the cost and indicate the sensitivity of cost to the
values of certain of these parameters.
1Nutter et al., "Oil Shale Economics Update", TOSCO, April 18, 1978.
2Pforzheimer, "Commercial Evaluation of an Oil Shale Industry Based on
the Paraho Process," Paraho, 9/77.
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TABLE B-1: MINING COSTS1
Mine
Size
(tons/day)
Capital
Costs
$M
Underground:
Cameron2 85,000 170 5'
Tosco3 66,000 270 3)
Paraho 4 157,421 750 9
Surface5
Industry Average6
Industry Average Including Leasing Costs
Oper.
Costs
$M/Yr.
7
Total
Equivalent Cost
($/BBL)
10% return 15% return
3.80
4.80
5.40
2.80
4.40
5.50
4.80
7.00
7.90
4.00
6.20
8.20
1. Includes costs incurred to mine the shale rock, crush the
dispose of the spent shale. The final industry average also
estimate of leasing costs.
rock and
contains an
2. Cameron Engineers, A Technical and Economic Study of Candidate
Underground Mining Systems for Deep, Thick Oil Shale Deposits, B.O.M.,
11/76. Cost Estimates are for a mine producing 85,000 tons per days of
shale rock for a 355 day year.
3. Tosco, "Oil Shale Economics Update," Nutter et al, 4/78. Cost
estimates are for a mine producing 66,000 tons per day of shale rock with
a .9 stream factor.
4. Paraho, "Commercial Evaluation of an Oil Shale Industry Based on the
Paraho Process," Pforzheimer et al, 9/77. Cost estimates are for a mine
producing 157,421 tons per day with a .9 stream factor.
5. We assume that 15% of the shale can be surface mined at a cost of 60%
of the industry average cost for underground mining.
6. The Industry Average Cost was computed using the following weights:
for underground mining (85% of total); .30 (Cameron), .35 (Tosco), .35
(Paraho).
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B.3 SURFACE RETORTING
Introduction
Surface retorting of shale can be performed in any one of a number
of ways. The three major techniques are: (1) circulation of inert
solids through the vessel; (2) upflow of shale using solids pumps and;
(3) downflow of shale through a vessel. This section reviews four
commercial designs, the Tosco II, Lurgi-Ruhrgas, Union and Paraho Direct
retort processes. This selection affords each of the generic retort
approaches representation by a potentially competitive design. The
choice of retorts is dictated, however, not only by commercial potential
but also by the availability of information. The following section
reviews the cost estimate for each of these retort designs and provides a
weighted industry average cost of retorting.
Summary of Industry Cost Estimates for Surface Retorting
The Tosco II Retort
Retorting for the Tosco II process occurs in a solid-to-solid heat
transfer retort. Preheated oil shale, crushed to a size of 1/2-inch or
smaller, is fed into the retort along with 1/2-inch externally heated
ceramic balls. The process recovers 100 percent of the total crude oil
produced by Fischer assay as well as matching Fischer assay yields of
medium Btu gases.1
The Tosco II retort has been tested in both a 25 ton-per-day pilot
plant and a 1,000 ton per day semi-works. The 1,000 ton-per-day
1It should be noted that part of the processed gas must be used to
preheat the shale and ceramic balls thereby lowering the net energy
yields of the retort.
B-6
semi-works plant, tested between 1965 and 1972, has retorted 220,000 tons
of oil shale and produced about 180,000 barrels of crude shale oil. No
indication of duration of operation or operating performance (stream
factor) is provided. TOSCO corporation reports do label this
demonstration effort as successful.
Cost calculations for a commercial size Tosco II operation were
performed in 1974. Engineering contractors perpared a detailed design
and cost estimate for a 66,000 ton-per-day operation. The facility
requires a series of six 11,000 ton-per-day Tosco II retorts. Recently
an updated version of the cost of this facility has been made available
(Nutter et al., "Oil Shale Economics Update", Tosco, 4/78). Table B2
summarizes these costs.
The Lurgi/Ruhrgas Retort
The Lurgi operation retorts shale by placing it in direct contact
with hot solids. Oil shale, crushed to sizes smaller than 1/4 inch, is
mixed in the retort with six to eight times as much hot, spent shale.
The heat required for the retorting process is obtained by burning a
portion of the residual carbon on the spent shale. The retort produces
105 weight percent of Fischer assay crude shale oil as well as a medium
Btu gas.
The basic Lurgi retort has an extensive operating background. A
4000 TPD retort exists and has been commercially applied to both coal and
liquid petroleum feedstocks. Application to oil shale, however, remains
small. To date only a 20 TPD pilot plant has operated on Colorado oil
shale. Lurgi publications report a successful test.
Assuming the basic 4000 TPD Lurgi retort is easily adaptable to oil
shale, scale-up requirements necessitate only a doubling of the retort
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output to 8000 TPD. The commercial complex envisioned includes eight
8000 TPD retorts that will combine to produce 50,000 BPD of crude shale
oil from 30 GPT shale.
An estimate of the combined total costs for the retorting section of
a 50,000 BPD Lurgi operation is available. The cost assumes the plant is
constructed in Germany and the figure based on the 4th quarter 1975
dollars and a Deutschmark-to-dollar exchange rate of 2.5. No attempt was
made to consider other capital costs such as those required for
utilities, community support etc., nor are any operating costs
presented. The estimate (adjusted for inflation) appears in Table B-2.
Assumed values for operating costs and off-site costs are also included.
The Union Retort
In the Union process shale is moved up through the retort by means
of solids pumps. Crushed shale, reduced to sizes less than 2 inches,
enters a rock pump at the bottom of the retort and is forced upward
through the device. Heated gas enters the top of the retort and upon
contact with the shale releases both liquid and gaseous fuels which
collect at the bottom of the retort. The process produces 100% of the
Fischer assay crude shale oil as well as producing medium Btu gases.1
Although Union has a long history of retort design experience, the
current retort has a limited testing background. A 1200 TPD semi-works
reflecting an earlier Union design was constructed in the late 50's,
however, the retort's low Fischer assay yields and its production of
large quantities of low-Btu gases (of little commercial value) rendered
it an economically undesirable design. The current Union retort design,
1A portion of the gas must be used in the retorting process thereby
lowering the net energy yields of the retort.
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a modified version of the first, has only been operated as a 3 TPD pilot
plant. Union publications do report that the pilot plant tests have been
successful. Future plans for the Union retort call for the construction
of a 10,000 TPD commercially-sized retort and the necessary support
operations to allow the production of 9000 BPD of crude shale oil from 41
GPT shale. Additional retorts will be added along with refining capacity
contingent on the first retort's success.
Only the most general cost information is available for the Union
retort. A combined estimate of the total capital costs for the mining,
retorting and support facilities for the 10,000 TPD plant is available as
well as an estimate of the operating costs for this complex (Hopkins et
al., "Development of Union Oil Company Upflow Retorting Technology", p.
12). No breakdown of these costs is provided. The cost figure (adjusted
for inflation) is presented in Table B-2.
The Paraho Retort
In the Paraho process retorting results from direct gas-to-solids
contact. Rising recycled gas entering the bottom of the retort is heated
by the retorted shale. Additional process heat requirements are
generated by burning some of the gas as well as gasifying some of the
carbon in the retorted shale. The Paraho process yields 90% of Fischer
assay oil as well as three times the Fischer yield of medium grade Btu
gas. The yields of oil plus gas, on a Btu basis, are 103% of Fischer
assay yields.1
1Note, these yields are net of requirements for retort heating.
Indirect heated retorts have carbon on the shale and burn retort products
in fuel process heaters. Paraho figures indicate that if Paraho retort
yields include process fuel the Paraho retort's efficiency increases to
114% of assay.
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TABLE B-2: SURFACE RETORTING COSTS1
Total
Equivalent Cost
($/BBL)
Capital Oper. 10% return 15% return
Retort Size, Costs Costs
Retort: Bbl/Day $M $M/Yr.
Tosco2 55,000 510 43 7.60 11.80
Union3 10,000 92 N.A. 8.00 12.50
Lurgi5 50,000 30 N.A. 5.20 12.50
Paraho5 100,000 700 81 5.30 7.90
Industry Average6 6.50 9.90
1. Includes costs incurred to recover raw shale oil; to use, sell or
dispose of all product streams; and to burn carbon from spent shale if
applicable.
2. Tosco, "Oil Shale Economics Update," Nutter et al, 4/78.
3. Union, "Shale Oil--A Synthetic Fuel Whose Time Has Come," Hartley,
11/78.
4. Lurgi, "Economic Data for a 50,000 BPD Lurgi/Ruhrgas Shale Oil Plant,"
Harnell 3/76.
5. Paraho, "Economic Evaluation of an Oil Shale Industry Based on the
Paraho Process," 9/77.
6. The Industry Average Cost was computed using the following weights: .4
(Tosco), .1 (Union), .1 (Lurgi), .4 (Paraho).
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The Paraho retort has been tested extensively at the semi-works
scale. The most recent test run for the 300 TPD semi-works plant,
performed during 1977-1978, was labelled a great success. The retort
operated with over a 90% stream factor and a record run of 105 days of
continuous operation. To date, the semi-works has retorted over 200,000
tons of shale to produce over 100,000 barrels of crude oil. No Paraho
retort larger than 300 TPD, however, has operated on oil shale.
The costs of a Paraho complex have been estimated by Paraho.1 A
detailed cost evaluation of a commercial operation was performed for 5
alternative strategies. Each of these strategies looks at a specified
mixture of Paraho direct retorts and Paraho's indirect retort.
Alternative 1 (18 direct, 6 indirect, syncrude fuel production) was
chosen as the most representative figure of Paraho's costs; table B2
summarizes this cost estimate.
Industry Cost Estimate Summary
The cost information available for each retort is summarized in
Table B2; the costs have been put into a comparable form and adjusted to
reflect 4th quarter 1978 dollars. (Union and Lurgi figures lacked any
detail; therefore several heroic assumptions had to be made to isolate
the retorting cost/bbl using either of these processes).2
1Pforzheimer et al., "Commercial Evaluation of an Oil Shale Industry
Based on the Paraho Process," 11th Israel Conference on Mech. Eng., 9/77.
2In particular the lack of cost breakdowns between mining and retorting
for the Union plan and the absence of operating cost estimates for the
Lurgi retort render our cost figures for these technologies tenuous at
best.
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To generate an industry average value for the cost of surface
retorting, weights were required for each retort's costs. These weights
were meant to reflect consideration for the firmness of each estimate and
were not judgments about the desirability or cost of individual retort
technologies. Accordingly each retort's testing history and cost
estimate were reviewed in terms of the following criteria:
(1) Size of operational retort designed specifically for oil shale
(2) Scale up required for existing retort to produce retort of
commercial size
(3) Engineering performance record of operational retort
(4) Availability of detailed cost information
(5) Degree of effort put into generation of cost estimates
The retort estimates were also evaluated in terms of the level of
ease with which we could put these estimates into comparable form.
Unsurprisingly, the Paraho and Tosco II processes received the high
weights. Both have had successful engineering tests on oil shale,
detailed cost information published, and significant effort put into the
generation of these estimates. Union and Lurgi's figures come with
limited testing experience, and are incomplete and undetailed. Thus they
received low weights. The average figure is used in the sensitivity
analysis performed in Section 2 of the main report.
B4. Upgrading
Raw shale oil must be treated to allow for further processing by
conventional refining techniques. Levels of nitrogen and metal
concentrations must be reduced. Byproducts, such as ammonia and sulfur,
do result from such processes and byproduct credits are accounted for in
the figures provided.
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The cost estimates we employed for computing the Industry Average
cost estimate were prepared by Paraho, Tosco, and Chevron. A summary
of the figures from these estimates is given in Table B-3.
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TABLE B-3: UPGRADING COSTS1
Total
Equivalent Cost
($/BBL)
Reactor Size
Bbl/Day
Paraho2
Tosco3
Chevron4
100,000
66,000
100,000
Industry
Average5
Capital
Costs
$M
460
210
600
N.A.
Net
Oper.
Costs
$M/Yr.
55
5.2
33
N.A.
10%
return
3.50
2.30
4.20
3.30
15%
return
5.30
3.90
5.90
5.00
1. Includes costs incurred to reduce nitrogen and metals in raw shale oil
and make marketable byproducts. All costs are adjusted to 4th quarter
1978 dollars.
2. Paraho, "Commercial Evaluation of an Oil Shale Industry Based on the
Paraho Process," Pforzheimer et al., 8/77.
3. Tosco, "Oil Shale Economics Update", Nutter et al., 4/78.
4. Chevron, "Refining and Upgrading of Synfuels from Coal and Oil Shales
by Advanced Catalytic Processes," 8/78.
5. The Industry Average Cost was computed using the following weights:
.34 (Paraho), .33 (Tosco), .33 (Chevron).
Retort:
